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Abstract In this paper we discuss a controlled experiment on the enforcement of
sanctioning for fare evasion in trains in the Netherlands. The experiment ran for 2
years, and the extent to which sanctions were effectively imposed was compared for
non-chronic fare evaders in two regions. Travellers caught without a ticket who had
not paid on the spot were divided into two conditions. In the (regular) control
condition, the Dutch railways attempted to recover the cost of the unpaid ticket, plus
a small penalty, followed by regular, civil law, debt collection procedures. In the
experimental condition, the efforts by the Dutch railways were followed by penalty
collection procedures by the Dutch Ministry of Justice’s fine collection agency. The
results under the experimental condition were worse than those under the standard
procedure. Both conditions have (often lengthy) follow-up procedures entailing
criminal prosecution, which are not reported upon here. We discuss the implications
and the questions that these findings raise.
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Introduction
Khalil Ibrahim is considered by some to be the intellectual leader of the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM), one of the two main rebel groups in Darfur, in Western
Sudan. Mr. Ibrahim, who is a medical doctor and is called ‘Dr.’ by his co-rebels,
holds a French passport. He now lives in France, and travels regularly, yet furtively
via Chad, from there to Sudan, where his wife and seven children still live. Before
settling in France, Dr. Khalil applied for asylum in the Netherlands, in 2001, and
lived for a while in Terschelling, a small island in the north of the country. In an
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interview with the weekly Elsevier (23 September 2006), he relates how amazed he
was at the ease with which he could travel for free by train in the Netherlands. He
says: ‘Whenever I was caught without a ticket, I would show my asylum seeker’s
pass, after which I’d receive a fine. But I never paid any of those fines’.
The Netherlands is a small and flat country. With distances short, freeways
congested, and towns often old and not built for processing lots of motorized traffic,
there is a fairly extensive public transport system in operation. A network of trains
stretches all over the country, and includes fast rail connections with France and
Germany. Smaller trains operate in some areas. Trams run within some cities;
Rotterdam and Amsterdam have subways. Buses operate within towns and in-
between towns and villages. As in many other countries, some of the passengers in
the public transport system travel without a (valid) ticket.
In self-report surveys, fare dodging is often reported. For instance, among 1st and
3rd grade secondary school students in the western urbanized part of the
Netherlands, around 50% report fare dodging at least once during the preceding
school year (Weerman 2007), probably most often in trams. Similar results are found
in other European countries with fairly extensive public transport systems
(Bornewasser and Schulze 2003; Kivivuori and Savolainen 2003).
Fare evasion is a neglected though important topic of study for several reasons.
Firstly, fare evasion implies loss of revenue for public transport operators. Secondly,
many anti-social and criminal behaviours in the transport environment (verbal abuse,
threats, intimidation and other disorderly behaviours, spitting, and physical assaults
on staff) are often associated with attempts to enforce payment. Third, use of
transport may be affected, as passengers become upset and intimidated by witnessing
such confrontations. Fourth, those who evade paying for a ticket may be the same
people who are responsible for other anti-social, disorderly and criminal behaviour
in transit environments.
The manner in which fare evasion can be countered has been studied minimally in
the criminological literature. While fare evasion is an offence in many countries, law
enforcement is not the only manner with which one can tackle the problem.
Operators have implemented physical barriers to prevent fare evasion or at least
make it much harder or less attractive to carry out. The enforcement of penalties for
fare evasion is important not only from a monetary perspective (in that the
transporter may regain some of the losses) but also from the point of view of general
deterrence.
This paper gives the results of a controlled trial in the Netherlands in which the
efficacies of two penalty collection methods were compared. The methods were
administered randomly. In the following sections, some background information will
first be given on the Dutch public transport systems and the incidence of fare
evasion. Next, we will outline relevant criminological theory pertaining to fare
evasion and measures to counter or prevent it. We then describe the design of the
experiment, in which the efficacy of an experimental penalty scheme was contrasted
with the efficacy of the standard penalty scheme. The experimental penalty scheme
was deemed to imply both a greater likelihood of the penalty’s being effectively
imposed and a more severe penalty. After detailing the design of the experiment, we
present the findings that show how—surprisingly—the new penalty system
performed significantly worse than the standard one. We conclude by discussing
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the implications for policy and research, and by offering a number of explanations
for these unexpected findings.
Fare evasion in public transport in the Netherlands
Until the 1960s, almost all trams and buses in the Netherlands had sales personnel on
board who sold and checked tickets. In the course of the 1960s, these were replaced by
machines, as that was deemed cheaper. Until then, tickets for trains were generally sold
by personnel at the entrance of stations. In some stations it was necessary to have a
‘platform’ ticket to be allowed to enter the platform, although there was generally no
physical obstacle to entry. As machines replaced staff, however, fare evasion increased,
in buses, trams and trains. Vandalism and aggression is reported to have increased
alongside (Van Andel 1989), though this has not been studied in much detail.
In buses, fare evasion was tackled by (re)installing a virtually closed entry system:
passengers in almost all buses must now enter via the front door, past the driver, who
serves as ticket seller at stops, and with back exits often blocked for entry from outside.
In many trams, random checks at stops were introduced. Such new measures were
evaluated in a study by Van Andel (1989). Even though the introduction of these
measures was not assessed through a true experiment, and, simultaneously, a number
of other measures were imposed to combat fare evasion, these new measures were
judged to be effective, particularly in cities where fare evasion was widely prevalent,
where the measures implied a radical new policy, and where controlling personnel
could actually impose sanctions on fare evaders. The new measures could not be
shown to have a measurable effect on feelings of safety, however. Within the past few
years, the system of the 1960s has returned in some trams in Rotterdam and
Amsterdam to reduce fare dodging, with a ticket seller at the back entrance of the tram,
or a ticket controller present during the entire trip, who checks every passenger’s ticket.
In trains, entry is still much more open. Travellers buy a ticket from one of a
number of machines inside the station, or they may buy a ticket at a small additional
charge from personnel. Entrance to the platform, and entry into the train, is still
unrestricted, although at some larger stations in the evenings and, at times, randomly,
passengers’ tickets are checked at the bottom of the stairs that give access to the
platform. In principle, an inspector checks the tickets of passengers. The Dutch
railway transport company [Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS)] strives for an inspection
chance of 50% for trips lasting at least 30 minutes. For comparison, Leiden–
Amsterdam, which is a usual commuting distance, takes about 35 minutes, and the
Hague–Rotterdam takes a little over 15 minutes. On average, this target is met,
though not in the evening, and not always in the urbanized western part of the
country. Most inspectors are authorized detection personnel (‘Bevoegd Opsporings
Ambtenaar’) and may charge an increased price for those travelling without a ticket,
which is the standard ticket price for the trip plus a surcharge, or they may write an
official report and impose a fine for fare evasion. Fare evasion is an offence in the
Dutch criminal code [‘Wet Personenvervoer’ (Transport law) 2000, article 70].
It is estimated by NS that, in 2003, which is the relevant year to quote, given the
study reported here, approximately 3% of trips made by travellers on the Dutch
railways took place without a valid ticket. That constitutes a loss of income to the
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company amounting to an estimated 3% to 4% of its gross annual income from
transportation. In addition, it was estimated in 2003, from the so-called incident
reports that inspectors detail after an incident on a train (which are collected and
analysed by NS), that around 60% of all violence in Dutch trains is directly related to
fare evasion (NVA/Leemans 2004). Such violence can range from verbal threats and
abuse to actual hands-on violence. It may be directed at fellow travellers, but is often
directed at personnel. Train inspectors reported to this author that groups of young
travellers, rather than junkies or vagabonds, are particularly regarded as intimidating
and threatening. Psychiatric patients or those presumed to behave in such a way are
sometimes approached with care, as some inspectors have experienced that they can
suddenly become very aggressive. In 2003, 80% of travellers felt safe in the station,
and 40% felt safe there at night. Personnel give slightly lower ratings (NVA/Leemans
2004). Combatting fare evasion is, thus, also important to increase what is often called
‘social safety’ (‘sociale veiligheid’) in and around the trains (NVA/Leemans 2004).
In 2003 an estimated 5.4 million incidents of fare evasion took place in Dutch
trains (NVA/Leemans 2004). In approximately 1.6 million of these incidents
payment of the regular ticket price plus a surcharge was imposed, meaning that
about 30% of estimated cases led to the imposition of a sanction. In 1 million cases,
these ticketless travellers paid on the spot. In around 600,000 cases, the inspector
wrote out and handed to the passenger a so-called Uitstel van Betaling [Delay of
Payment form(UvB)]. A UvB is formally an official report, by which—when signed
by an authorized inspector—prosecution can take place. However, if the customer
pays within a certain legal period, prosecution is deferred. Two-thirds of these UvBs
remained unpaid in 2003 (NVA/Leemans 2004). This means that out of 1.6 million
discovered incidents of fare evasion, 1.2 million, or 75%, lead to some form of
penalty, either payment on the spot, or later. This amounts to an effective penalty
probability of 22% over all estimated incidents.
The NS (cf. Beke 2004) distinguishes fare evaders into—largely—three different
groups, each not purchasing a ticket for different reasons. The first type comprise the
accidental fare evaders, who, for example, have left their wallets at home, or have
rushed into the train to catch it, forgetting to buy a ticket. The second type is
composed of the calculating dodgers, who simply calculate their expected loss and
reason that it is cheaper to be caught once in a while and pay the increased rate (or
not pay), rather than buy a ticket every time. Both these first two types do not
generally cause unrest or danger in trains. The first type in general pays the UvB,
but, for the second type, this is often not the case. The third type is qualified as the
chronic fare evader. Beke (2004) studied the 100 most frequent fare evaders within
this latter group. In 2003, those 100 fare evaders received between 107 and 356
UvBs each. Ninety percent of this top 100 have a criminal record, 70% are drug and/
or alcohol dependent. Those who are generally aggressive when caught tend to be
homeless as well. It is this latter group that contributes most to feelings of danger in
the stations and trains. It should be noted that 8% of all fare evaders are responsible
for 50% of all UvBs; the distribution is thus heavily skewed, a phenomenon not
unknown in other areas of criminological research.
Thus, there is heterogeneity in motives for fare evasion, in problem behaviour as a
result of fare evasion and its discovery, and in the extent to what the various types of
fare evaders can be made to pay in some kind of penalty.
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Theoretical backdrop of the experiment
Most of the literature on fare evasion (see Smith and Clarke 2000) deals with measures to
prevent fare evasion, such as physical access measures or increased surveillance. There
is a much wider associated body of literature on crimes in the public system, such as
vandalism, and crimes against fellow passengers or against staff. This literature is also
of relevance to studies on fare evasion, as it is firstly presumed that it is generally the
same persons who are responsible for these offences: those who assault staff or who rob
fellow passengers also often travel without a ticket. Finder (1991, in Smith and Clarke
2000) reported how measures to combat fare evasion were associated with a decrease in
more serious offences in the New York subway, as did a study in greater London
(Cubic Transportation Systems 2005) in which the installation of gates was associated
with a 14% fall in crime on the railway in south London in 1998. Secondly, as was
reported for the Netherlands above and has been reported for other countries, the
discovery of, or disputes over, fare evasion itself may lead to assaults on staff (viz.
Smith and Clarke 2000). As such, fare dodging may elicit other offences.
Most of the literature on the combating of fare evasion focuses on either higher
apprehension chances by more intensive supervision at entry, exit or ticket
inspections, or on the installation of physical barriers, such as turnstiles. The theory
behind physical barriers to entry without a valid ticket is situational crime
prevention. While access is not impossible, it is definitely much harder, and more
obstacles need to be overcome—physical in the case of a turnstile and psychological
in the case of a closed entry system in a bus. Thus, the cost for fare dodging goes up,
and a rational offender might, therefore, when the costs or the efforts outweigh the
gains, refrain from fare evasion and simply buy a ticket. The expected loss of fare
evasion can also start outweighing the gain when—assuming that apprehension leads
to sanctioning—either the apprehension chance goes up or the loss itself goes up.
Much less has been written on this deterrent effect of penalties for fare evasion. The
studies reported on by Smith and Clarke (2000) pertain to the evaluation of the
effectiveness of increased inspection and, thus, apprehension chances: in Anglo-
Saxon countries, as well as in the Netherlands, increased inspection, either during
travel or at entry or exit, has been generally associated with (strongly) decreased
rates of fare evasion. Much less has been reported on the deterrent effect of stiffer
penalties for fare evasion that would similarly increase the expected loss.
There is a fairly solid body of literature on deterrence (see e.g. Von Hirsch et al.
1999, Nagin 1998, and the much older, but still relevant, Blumstein et al. 1978 and
Zimring and Hawkins 1973). Much of this literature focuses on general deterrence of
incapacitating sanctions and the death penalty. Zimring and Hawkins (1973) also
discuss deterrence findings with regard to what they name ‘folk crimes’, under which
the fare dodging incidents studied here are perhaps best ranked. Quite a number of
years ago, they recommended that more studies be conducted on the deterrent effect of
sanctions for this type of offence; however, in doing so, they focus most strongly on
offences such as thrill seeking traffic offences (mainly drunk driving, dangerous
driving and speeding), which are only marginally comparable to the kind of
economically profitable norm-transgressing behaviour we are discussing here.
A smaller part of the literature deals with the mechanisms by which certain
policies have a deterrent effect. Von Hirsch et al. (1999) state—inter alia, but we
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quote the relevant parts—that as offenders essentially weight the costs and benefits
of offending behaviour, the costs can be increased in at least two ways: by increasing
the certainty of punishment (in this case, the certainty of penance for fare evasion)
and by increasing the severity of punishment (in this case, the costs of punishment
for fare evasion). Although the expected loss of fare evasion can be calculated as the
product of the apprehension chance multiplied by the penalty enforcement chance
and the penalty, the various parts of the equation appear to play an asymmetric role:
as Pratt et al. (2006) show in their meta-analysis, while almost all the evidence for
deterrence is dubious, only the certainty of punishment and the negative effects of
non-legal sanctions are ‘large enough to be considered substantively important.’
Such non-legal sanctions are negative by-products of sanctioning, such as losing
one’s job, shame, or gaining the disapproval of one’s partner.
The evidence for the deterrent effect of penalty schemes on fare evasion is scattered
and inconclusive. A study in greater London showed that, in areas in which a penalty
fare applied, fare evasion was estimated to be 3%; in the area in which no such penalty
system applied, fare evasion was estimated at 8%. This would point to a deterrent
effect of penalties (Department for Transport 2005). On the other hand, a study in
southwest London, where a penalty fare scheme was in operation, indicated that the
penalty fare scheme was unpopular with passengers and was never established as an
effective deterrent to fare evasion (Cubic Transportation Systems 2005).
This study attempts to contribute both to theory and policy. As a new penalty
scheme will be compared with the standard scheme, the results from the study will
provide evidence for operators and policy makers. Additionally, this study will test,
in a classical experiment, whether any greater deterrent effect can be expected of a
new penalty collection scheme that implies both a higher penalty probability and
penalties that can be supposed to be regarded by the public as stiffer. We will now
outline the experiment in detail.
Experiment design
NS initiated a pilot scheme in April 2003, together with the Special Prosecutor for
Traffic Offences and the Ministry of Justice fine collection agency, CJIB (‘Centraal
Justitieel Incasso Bureau’), to investigate whether a different penalty scheme would
lead to increased sanctioning rates among those receiving a UvB. The backdrop of
this pilot scheme was that NS deemed penalty collection rates too low. Until then, of
those fare evaders receiving an UvB, about 24% paid directly to NS and another 6%
paid after two reminders, via NS’s own fine collection agency. Placing turnstiles had
previously been considered, but, with an estimated cost of €750 million, this was
considered too costly until other options had been investigated. The CJIB, the
Ministry of Justice’s fine collection agency, had estimated that it would be able to
increase the civil debt collection agency 6% rate to approximately 25%, downscaling
its own fine collection rates for other offences.
The experiment was neither designed nor expected to provide a comprehensive
solution for all fare evasion in trains. NS implemented different schemes for different
kinds of fare evaders. Simultaneously with the experiment reported upon here, it
started an experiment to assess the efficacy of ‘treinverboden’ (a police measure in
188 C. Bijleveld
which a person is forbidden to enter a train for a period of time) coupled with highly
intensive supervision, to reduce fare evasion by a small group of known, chronic
dodgers. Also, during the course of the experiment reported upon here, NS
introduced a standard penalty of €35 for travel without a valid ticket. This penalty
can be regarded as targeted more at the group of accidental fare evaders. The
experiment reported upon here is thus geared to this latter group, and to the most
obscure group of calculating dodgers, of whom some pay and some do not, who may
cause trouble when they are caught dodging and thus generate feelings of danger
among staff and passengers. The experiment should thus be seen as one of a packet
of different measures to combat fare evasion, tailored to the respective subgroups of
fare evaders.
While all measures ultimately aimed also to increase social safety, the dependent
variable investigated here is whether a penalty has been paid by the fare evader. The
experiment thus investigates to what extent the new, experimental penalty scheme
and the old standard penalty scheme were effective in the sense that they would
succeed in making fare evaders pay. An experimental design had been chosen to
ensure maximum internal validity.
Standard procedure during the experiment upon discovery of fare evasion
(control procedure)
At the time of the experiment, the standard policy when an incident of fare evasion
was discovered was that fare evaders were asked to buy a ticket in the train from the
ticket inspector, at an increased price.
Stage 1 Those who cannot pay because they have no money on them are asked to
identify themselves (name, address, postal code and proof of identity). The inspector
checks that the postal code and address given exist and match. Those who give a
non-existing address may be handed over to the railway police, but it is uncertain
whether this actually happens a lot as the procedure is very cumbersome and may
generate a lot of aggression, because the train may need to be stopped and is then
delayed, which incurs the wrath of the other travellers and leads to further loss of
revenue. Those who give an existing address are given a UvB. Stage 1 is thus
concluded.
Stage 2 NS then sends the fare evaders a bill at home, with a giro card to transfer the
amount due to NS. Those who do not pay within 2 weeks are sent a reminder and are
given the legally required payment period of 30 days to pay. Quite a number of cards are
returned to NS at this stage because the person is unknown at that address. Inspectors
reported to this author that, at times, they know that fare evaders do not supply their true
identity; secondary school students are reported to often carry a fictive school agenda on
them for the purpose of fare dodging, which lists an existing address with a fictitious
name that they show to the inspector when they are caught without a ticket.
Stage 3 Next, the remaining bills are sent to a debt collection agency that re-sends
the bills with an added amount for ‘debt collection costs’. The bills of fare evaders
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who have amassed more than three UvBs are not sent all at once: first, two UvBs are
sent, and, if these are paid, any further bills are also sent on. Those who do not pay
are reminded again. Usually, debt collection agencies in the Netherlands (‘Incasso-
bureau’) threaten people with a bailiff who may come and, if necessary, seize a
person’s goods by force to cover the cost of the bill. However, on the back of the NS
debt collection agency’s letter it says that a bailiff will not be called in; it is unknown
how well these letters are read, if at all. The debts of those who also do not pay at
this stage are returned to the NS as irrecoverable.
Stage 4 NS collects these irrecoverable UvBs. Those fare evaders who amass five or
more irrecoverable debts within one year may be collected into one single court file
and sent on to the prosecutor’s office for prosecution. In the past, files that were sent
on to the prosecutor’s office contained, on average, nine UvBs. Before doing so, NS
checks the address and has the UvBs signed by the inspector, in which case they
obtain the formal status of an official report. If it turns out that the name and address
do not match, the Railway Police may conduct an additional investigation to find out
the person’s true identity. If that fails, the file is closed. If the address data are correct
or have been found out, NS hands over the file to the prosecutor’s office.
By stage 4, there is no more money to collect for NS, but the prosecutor’s office
can, in principle, prosecute the defaulters and fine them or impose other sanctions, or
even bring the case to court, in which case detention may be imposed. Such cases,
however, do not overly excite prosecutors, especially given their qualitatively and
quantitatively increasing workload. In addition, in the past, many cases that were
prosecuted failed, because prosecution took place in the region in which the offender
lived, rather than in the region where the offence was committed, which gave rise to
many procedural complications. Next, the perpetrators are reported often to be
people with very little in terms of bank accounts or employment and for whom
possibly the only sanction that can be envisaged is incarceration. Given the (in the
past) overstretched detention facilities in the Netherlands, prosecution and
sanctioning for these offences has been incidental at most. However, many files
never reached the stage where they could be sent on for prosecution, because they
simply never met the target of five UvBs in a year. Thus, in practice, many fare
evaders could travel without a ticket safely and without any bother, if they took care
not to amass more than five UvBs within a year, and they could, in practice, also
often do so safely even if they exceeded the five yearly UvBs.
See Fig. 1.
New procedure during experiment (experimental condition)
Stage 1 is identical in the experimental and control condition.
Stage 2 In the experimental condition, stage 2 is almost identical to its control
counterpart. At the start of the experiment, the legal minimum for civil debt collection
was 28 days and the debt collection phase was the same in both conditions for stage 2.
However, during the experiment, the legal minimum was changed in terms of duration
and spacing of reminders, so this procedure was extended by 2 days, from 28 days to
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30 days, in the control condition. Towards the end of the experiment, there were thus
slight differences in the sense that, in the experimental condition, a reminder was sent
after 7 days, with a new payment period of 21 days, while, in the control condition, a
reminder was sent after 14 days, with a second payment period of 16 days. This makes
discovery of fare dodging:
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Fig. 1 Schematic representation of control and experimental conditions
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a difference of 2 days a month, a difference that was effectuated midway through the
project.
Having arrived at the end of stage 2 in the experimental condition, NS checks all
UvBs to see whether the name and address on the UvB match; in contrast to the check
conducted by the inspector (who only checks whether the fare evader has given an
existing address), NS checks whether this person actually lives at the given address.
There are three possible outcomes: (1) the person is registered at the given address, in
which case the UvB is sent on to the CJIB, the Ministry of Justice’s fine collection
agency, for stage 3; (2) the person is registered at a different address, in which case the
UvB is sent back to stage 2 and the entire stage 2 is re-run for this person; (3) the
person does not live at the given address and no address for that person can be found
elsewhere in the Netherlands, in which case the UvB is irrecoverable and set aside; see
Fig. 1, where the experimental condition has been outlined on the right-hand side.
UvBs that are sent on to the CJIB undergo a number of further checks, and those that
meet the CJIB’s technical demands are entered into the CJIB’s database.
Stage 3 From the start of stage 3 in the experimental condition, CJIB attempts to
recover the penalty. Fare evaders are sent a letter in which they are asked to pay and
are threatened with prosecution and a criminal record if they do not. If CJIB fails to
collect the money, the UvBs are sent back to NS. NS then gets the inspector to sign
the UvBs, in which case they obtain the formal status of an official report, on which
prosecution can be started.
Stage 4 NS sends each signed UvB back to CJIB, who sends it on to the
prosecutor’s office. The difference in the final stage 4 in the control condition is that
here UvBs are sent on a case-by-case basis. Prosecution—agreed beforehand with
the Special Prosecutor for Traffic Offences—for these experimental cases is then
started on the basis of one single incident. Also, before the start of the experiment,
an explicit policy had been formulated by the Special Prosecutor for Traffic Offences
that prosecutors would actually prosecute and not dismiss cases routinely for policy
reasons, which happens regularly for lesser delinquent acts in the Netherlands
(where prosecutors have fairly wide discretionary powers and may decide not to
prosecute for ‘expediency’ or policy reasons).
Thus, in summary, stage 1 is identical for experimental and control conditions. Stage 2
differs in that it gives a 2-day longer payment period in the experimental condition. Stage 3
differs in that NS sends on to its debt collection agency a favourable selection of persons
with UvBs, namely only those who have amassed two or fewer. On the other hand, a
difference that favours CJIB is that only those who have been established to be existing
persons living at the given addresses enter the experimental stage 3. In stage 3 the
experimental fare evaders are actually threatened with prosecution if they do not pay;
control fare evaders are asked to pay. In stage 4 those who have not yet paid are
prosecuted. For the control persons this can happen only when they have collected more
than five UvBs (and, in practice, happens on average when their file contains nine UvBs);
for the experimental fare evaders this happens on a case-by-case basis. Thus, in the
experimental condition, the certainty of punishment is increased. Also, the severity of
punishment (prosecution) can be considered to be increased in comparison with that in the
control condition.
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Design of controlled trial
The experiment included fare evaders from two regions (‘arrondissement’) that each
fall administratively under one prosecution department in the Netherlands: Dordrecht
and Amsterdam. These regions were chosen for the following reasons. Amsterdam,
the capital, is notorious for fare dodging. The designers had then wanted to increase
generalizability by adding a second region that included a smaller town. The
Prosecution department in Dordrecht agreed. The so-called notorious chronic fare
evaders were excluded from the experiment, as attempts to collect penalties had
proven to be fairly unsuccessful. They were believed to be relatively ‘undeterrable’ by
the sanctions imposed in the experiment, and different measures would be needed to
tackle fare evasion and anti-social behaviour in this group. A chronic fare evader was
defined as a person who had amassed ten or more UvBs during the preceding year.
A steering committee was formed, headed by the Special Prosecutor for Traffic
Offences, which included representatives from the prosecution departments, a
representative from the CJIB, from NS, as well as, in an advisory role, this author.
The committee met every 6 months. All costs were born by the collaborating
institutions. Day-to-day monitoring was carried out by NS.
All fare evaders from Dordrecht and Amsterdam first went through stage 1. Those
who had not paid by then were randomly divided into two groups at the start of
stage 2: a control group (the standard approach, as sketched above), and an
experimental group (the new approach). Randomization was carried out by NS,who
assigned respondents alternately to one or the other condition. Those respondents
who had previously had a UvB assigned to one condition were assigned to that same
condition with any subsequent UvBs. Control and experimental fare evaders from
the two regions were dealt with by the same NS agency in stage 2 and by the same
CJIB fine collection in stage 3.
Data collection
The project ran for 2 years, in the sense that fare evaders from Amsterdam and
Dordrecht were entered into the experimental or control conditions from April 2003
until April 2005, after which no new fare evaders were included in the experiment.
Data were collected in 3-monthly intervals while the project was ongoing. NS
supplied data on the control respondents, based on data from the debt collection
agency. CJIB supplied information on the experimental condition. NS compiled
these into overviews. After April 2005, data collection went on to investigate the
extent to which penalties were effectively imposed. Stage 3 data were analysed in
July 2006. For stage 4, on which we do not report here, data collection will extend to
2008, when all cases must be assumed to have been dealt with. Stage 3, by itself,
constitutes an experiment that assesses the efficacy of two different penalty schemes.
During the course of the experiment, this author conducted two group interviews
with a group of ticket inspectors who either worked on the train routes that were
relevant to the experiment or had a lot of experience as ticket inspectors. Also, the
author herself worked as a ticket inspector for one stretch during the rush hour (from
Amsterdam to Brussels) on a train route in which a lot of fare evasion is known to
take place. These additional data collection efforts served to obtain more in-depth
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background information, as well as to gauge whether inspectors might note that fare
evaders responded differently because of the new penalty scheme. No evidence for
the latter was found.
Results
The experimental condition took some time to function as designed, mainly because
the bureaucracy at CJIB needed tailoring and oiling. Also, throughout the
experiment, CJIB processed cases more slowly. By the last month of measurement,
about 11% of all UvBs had been entered into the standard procedure, and some 9%
per month had been entered into the experimental procedure. At some point, it was
decided that a number of randomly selected UvBs be additionally entered into the
experimental procedure, to ensure that there were approximately equal numbers in
both conditions.
We carried out a chi-square test to investigate whether the percentages
dispositioned by the various procedures at stage 3 were similar or different. It turned
out that there was a significant difference in these percentages (P<0.001): the NS debt
collection agency collected 1,335 out of a total of 12,318 UvBs (10.84%; z=−6.79),
against the CJIB’s collecting 890 out of 12,421 UvBs (7.17%) (z=6.82). The
standard procedure at stage 3 of the chain performed significantly better. See
Table 1.
How do we explain these unexpected results? Firstly, can the results be explained
by flaws in the experiment? As can be inferred from the description above, the
experimental and control condition are not exactly comparable. Apart from the
minor difference in payment periods that are highly unlikely to have led to a
different selection entering stage 3 for the experimental and control group, NS
favours its own collection agency, in the sense that it first offers the agency two
UvBs from dodgers with more than two UvBs. When these have been recovered,
any remaining UvBs are also sent on. It that sense NS’s own debt collection agency
receives a more favourable proportion of UvBs than CJIB does. However, as chronic
fare evaders were excluded from the experiment, the distortion will have been
notable only for those who turned into chronic offenders during the experiment. On
the other hand, next to this selection mechanism in the control condition, a selection
mechanism operates in the experimental condition as NS checks fare evaders’
identity before sending UvBs on to the CJIB. This means that the CJIB receives only
those fare evaders whose identification has been secured. Although NS again creams
off a very small number of these (namely those fare evaders who moved house right
between the writing of the UvB and the sending of the bill by NS), all in all, CJIB
also receives a cleaned, and favourable, selection of UvBs. This selection is probably
Table 1 Comparison of penalty schemes (#2=101.91, df=1, P<0.0001)
Condition Penalty Imposed Penalty not Imposed Total
NS (control) 1,335 10,983 12,318
CJIB (experimental) 890 11,531 12,421
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a more favourable selection than NS offers to its debt collection agency: CJIB is,
thus, in all likelihood, favoured.
There was little possibility to synchronize these mechanisms. The standard NS
procedure was the NS procedure and had to be kept intact as such. The name and
address check before sending on UvBs to the CJIB is a standard legal procedure and,
as such, had be conducted, and, given the nature of the experimental condition and
the ideas behind it, it would have been impossible to instal a similar mechanism as in
the control condition. The reiterative procedure—where NS re-sent the bills once it
was discovered that someone had moved—had to be followed in the experimental
condition, because otherwise people admonished by the CJIB could always claim
that the bills had never reached them, and claims would fall flat. In addition to the
inevitability of these differences, we have no reason to believe—as the differences
seem to favour each condition, though in a different way—that these differences are
such that they make it impossible to draw conclusions from the experiment or that it
is likely that the conclusions be reversed.
Randomization was secured, as assignment was systematic, and there is no
periodicity in UvBs that are sent to NS such that a systematic distortion could be
suspected. There is, unfortunately, no way to test for comparability in possibly
relevant characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, or previous criminal record, as NS
knows nothing about the (non-chronic) fare evaders it registers, except for their
names and addresses.
One explanation for the unexpected results may be that the criminal justice
system has more inertia than the standard NS debt collection system. Perhaps it took
longer in getting procedures to work and processing the workload, whereas the debt
collection agency was working along standard, well-known procedures. However,
these starting troubles took only a few months and had most to do with getting UvBs
delivered to the CJIB. In addition, there was a long period before the data were
analysed, which gave CJIB ample time to process cases.
Lastly, an explanation might be that an additional number of cases were added to
the experimental procedure to even out the numbers. Again, however, a long period
was taken for CJIB to process those cases, so that cannot explain the unexpected
results.
Conclusion and discussion
We conclude that, contrary to expectation, the experimental criminal law approach
performs significantly worse than the standard approach in making fare evaders pay.
In this group of fare evaders, penalties are more effectively imposed by the regular,
essentially civil law, approach than by the supposedly much more deterrent strong
arm of the criminal law. As such, we can also not expect any marginally better
(special or general) deterrent effect of the experimental approach or a positive effect
on public safety.
Our second conclusion is, therefore, that the standard approach is thus to be
preferred. This is not only because more people pay up quicker in this condition, but
also because, with this approach, NS gets at least some of its money back, and the
experimental approach must be assumed only to cost society. This is, by itself, not a
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valid argument for preferring one approach over the other, as prosecuting crime is
probably generally more costly than the damage done, narrowly considered. Hidden
costs (i.e. because there is no general deterrence) may, in addition, be higher. Also,
in this experiment, it might finally turn out to be the case that, after stage 4 of the
experiment has run its course, and we compare not only stage 3 results but include
stage 4 results (with more than five UvBs per prosecution in the standard approach
and a case-by-case, no policy dismissals, certain prosecution in the experimental
approach), the experimental approach performs similarly to, or even outperforms, the
standard approach. We believe that, even if that turned out to be the case, our
conclusion still holds, as not much effect can be expected from interventions on
behaviour that are meted out after such a long time.
This experiment should be viewed as one of a set of measures to tackle fare
evasion. It is understandable why this experiment chose to exclude chronic fare
evaders. The chronic dodger does not travel without a ticket because it is cheaper,
but simply because such a person has no money at all or lives in the train. As was
also shown by the Beke study (2004), many of the chronic evaders already have a
criminal record, so that criminal prosecution could not reasonably be expected to
have a marginal deterrent effect. The pilot study briefly described above, which was
geared towards fare evasion and social danger generated by this group, gave positive
results. Of the small group of 27 chronic fare dodgers targeted (NS 2005,
unpublished internal memorandum), only four continued to travel on the train
without a ticket; it must be said, though, that there was also some evidence for
displacement. In the meantime, the new €35 penalty for travelling without a valid
ticket was also evaluated (Hoefnagels 2006, unpublished internal memorandum).
Around the time of the introduction of this measure, there was a level decrease in the
number of fines handed out in the train and paid on the spot. There was, however, no
such association with the number of UvBs. Thus it appears that the €35 penalty may
have had a deterrent effect on the accidental dodgers, but that those who were used
to having UvBs written out against them, mainly the calculating dodgers, were less
affected.
Thus, we are faced with a group of fare evaders on whom new measures appear to
have little effect, and who appear unperturbed by increased threats. The new penalty
collection procedure through the CJIB entailed increased certainty of punishment
(and this was announced as such to the fare evader) as well as increased severity of
penalties (it had been assumed that precisely because of the threat of prosecution—
the ‘strong arm of the law’—and a criminal record, essentially a non-legal sanction,
people would pay). From the literature on deterrence we would thus have expected
that fare dodgers faced with more certain and stiffer penalties would pay sooner than
those threatened with no penalty at all. Surprisingly, they paid even less often.
This leads us to our third conclusion, namely that there exists a group of fare
dodgers who know how to evade—in the experimental ‘criminal law’ as well as in
the standard ‘civil law’ approach—sanctioning. Preliminary inspection of stage 4
data from the prosecutor’s offices is illustrative in this respect. These data show that
a very large proportion of prosecuted cases remained ‘pending’ and without
disposition for a long time. This can be explained by the fact that, in the
Netherlands, luckily, criminal justice procedures have many safeguards built into
them. For instance, for the defendants to be prosecuted, they must sign their writs
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(‘dagvaarding’) in person, by signing for receipt either at the door or at the post
office. Those who also dodge reception of this writ, for example by never opening
the door or never reacting to any summons, can extend their procedures for more
than a year. Of course, there are several measures of increasing intrusiveness, such as
the police finally picking someone up, but all such procedures take a fairly long
time. As of July 2005, 88% of fare evasion cases that had been registered with the
prosecution department 1 year previously had not been dispositioned yet.
It should be noted that these elusive fare evaders do not include the chronic
dodgers. This raises the question of what kind of citizens the fare dodgers studied
here are. The majority of them do not budge for NS claiming its money, or for the
threat of prosecution, and those for whom the threat of prosecution is made real
manage to evade that deftly, at least for a while. These fare evaders slip like a piece
of soap through the fingers of the machinery that attempts to catch them. Thus, it is
interesting, not only for this particular experiment, but also for the study of
deterrence and the effectiveness of sanctioning and sanctioning policies in general,
to find out who these people are, and why they do not respond to the threat of
sanctions.
Several hypotheses spring to mind. Firstly, the systems studied here are designed
by officials who assume that fare evaders understand that they are threatened, as well
as what they are threatened with. This is not necessarily the case. It may simply be
that the fare evaders studied here do not, to a large extent, understand the
implications of the penalties they are threatened with. It may be that the civil debt
collection agency’s letters are, in a sense, easier to understand, as it is a more
straightforward procedure. This might offer the beginning of an explanation as to
why the results under the experimental condition were worse than those under the
standard civil law condition. Secondly, it may also quite flatly be the case that these
fare evaders do not read official letters and, on principle, do not open the door. They
are unperturbed by any (official) request. They do not respond, and do not know
what happens. This does not explain, however, why the experimental approach came
off worse than the standard civil law one.
A surprising finding is that the fare dodgers studied here, who were caught and
did not pay on the spot, did give their true name and address. If they were not intent
on paying anyway, why did they not simply give a false name and escape all further
fuss? Apparently, these fare evaders are not bothered about giving their true identity.
However, the fare evaders who have made themselves known subsequently hold still
and do not respond. A third explanation is, therefore, that the fare evader studied
here is a so-called bald chicken (in Dutch the saying goes: ‘You can’t pluck feathers
from a bald chicken’). A bald chicken has nothing and, as such, also has not much to
lose. CJIB had estimated that they could make 25% pay; however, the regular group
of transgressors with whom CJIB deals are traffic offenders (mainly for traffic
offences that are dealt with administratively by CJIB), and this segment of the Dutch
population has at least some property (and thus also something to lose), in the form
of a car. It would thus be very interesting to know how many of the fare evaders
studied here are employed, and how many have a criminal record. As stated several
times above, the group of chronic evaders, hobo`s and junkies had been filtered out.
On the other hand, and this is our fourth hypothesis, it might be that the group
studied here is not at all marginalized but simply clever and well informed about the
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mazes in the system, or has become experienced, as Dr. Khalil had, in that no harm
will come to them if they simply keep quiet and ‘duck’. The group of fare dodgers
escaping penance would then better be qualified as ‘artful dodgers’. However, this
last hypothesis cannot explain why the experimental condition gave worse results.
Further research is needed on these fare evaders, to understand better who they
are and why they do not respond to the threat of sanctions. This is relevant not only
for this particular study and for designing policy measures for fare evasion, but also
theoretically. This experiment and the concurrent studies on other types of fare
dodgers have shown that some groups of offenders react as predicted by theory:
accidental dodgers respond when faced with stiffer penalties, and, although the study
was small, it does appear as if even chronic fare evaders react to increased
surveillance and tailored intervention. However, if there is a group of offenders that
are unaffected by increased certainty of punishment (as well as increased severity of
punishment), we need to understand the reasons for this, so that we can understand
why our theories do not apply to this group.
In the meantime, various other developments took place. The Policy Unit of the
Prosecutor’s Office decided, during the course of the experiment, that it would, in
future, not prosecute fare dodgers, except for notorious ones or those who refused to
provide identification (how this would be effectuated in practice is hard to see, as
that would, at times, entail stopping the train, waiting until the Railway Police arrive
to arrest someone, etc.) This means that prosecutorial policies have, in a sense,
overtaken the experiment from the right-hand side, and that the findings from this
experiment are of academic relevance only.
Developments at NS have also taken their course. In 2008 electronic entry gates
will be installed on almost all platforms, at almost all stations, making for an
effectively closed entry system that makes fare evasion technically much more
difficult. Experience with such systems abroad show, however, that fare evasion can
never be totally prevented and that a small and persistent group of fare dodgers and
turnstile jumpers will remain.
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